[Tails-dev] persistence warnings improvement suggestion

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Author: intrigeri
Date:  
To: tails-dev
Subject: [Tails-dev] persistence warnings improvement suggestion
hi,

regarding:

The persistent volume allows you to overwrite the configuration of
the programs included in Tails. Those programs are carefully
configured with security in mind. Overwriting the default
configuration can break this security or render them unusable.

Furthermore, the anonymity of Tor and Tails relies on making it
harder to distinguish one Tails user from another. <strong>Changing
the default configurations can break your anonymity.</strong>

I've seen a user who understood the "allows you to" in a way that it
would happen automatically, without clearly conscious action from
their side, even on a second read after being explained persistence
merely brought the *option* to do so.

So, I suggest this pseudo-diff change:

-Overwriting the default configuration can break this security or
-render them unusable.
+If you overwrite the default configuration, it can break this security or
+render these programs unusable.

I'm aware that "you" should be avoided, but I see no other way to
convey the idea that one really has to do something themselves to make
it happen. Better suggestions are welcome!

cheers,
--
intrigeri
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