[Tails-dev] flaw in: Correlates several downloads of Tails s…

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Author: adrelanos
Date:  
To: The Tails public development discussion list
Subject: [Tails-dev] flaw in: Correlates several downloads of Tails signing key
Hi!

https://tails.boum.org/doc/get/trusting_tails_signing_key/index.en.html#index1h1

As far I understand, this chapter assumes an adversary in a position to
break SSL or strip SSL (and the user not noticing).

With that assumption in mind, look at the graphic below.

user <-> user ISP <-> internet <-> boum.org ISP <-> boum.org server
MITM less likely for this route | no help for this route

This suggestion does not help against an adversary able to tamper with
traffic going through the boum.org ISP. No matter from which place the
user visits boum.org, an adversary in that position can always tamper
with the traffic.

This is still a useful suggestion for many people. For example for
people in censored countries, which get the key several times through
different Tor nodes and trust that more than their own network.

I think these limitations should be noted nonetheless.

Cheers,
adrelanos